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In Lowe (1995), instead of endorsing a Stalnaker/Lewis-style account of 
counterfactuals, E. J. Lowe claims that a variation of C. I. Lewis’s strict 
implication alone captures the essence of everyday conditionals and 
avoids the paradoxes of strict implication. However, Lowe’s approach 
fails to account for the validity of simple and straightforward arguments 
such as ‘if 2=3 then 2+1=3+1’, and Heylen & Horsten (2006) even claims 
that no variation of strict implication can successfully describe the logi-
cal behavior of natural language conditionals. By incorporating the Ger-
man logician O. Becker’s modal intuition with the insight of Ramsey’s 
Test, we show that there does exist a unifi ed, strict-conditional based ac-
count of everyday conditionals, which withstands all attacks previously 
raised against truth-conditional accounts of conditionals. Furthermore, 
a subtle distinction between autistic and realistic readings of the indexi-
cal ‘I’ involved in a conditional helps us resolve a recent debate concern-
ing the Thomason conditionals.
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1. Introduction
In Lowe (1995: 57), E. J. Lowe reckons
Conditionals in general present an extremely perplexing set of linguistic 
phenomena which often seem to defy a simple, uniform treatment of them 
for logical purpose.
Nevertheless, what he actually did was to try the seemingly impossi-
ble, namely, to defend a relatively simple core theory for them. Heylen 
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& Horsten (2006) defi ed Lowe’s attempt and proved in general that no 
future attempts along the line of variation of strict implication would 
ever succeed. I think Lowe’s attempt was indeed problematic, but Hey-
len and Horsten’s analysis was problematic as well, because it was mis-
led by an unwarranted assumption concerning possible worlds, which 
we shall explain in more detail later.
In Lowe (1983), Lowe expresses his general uneasiness towards the 
possible-world based account of conditional that were developed in the 
works of Stalnaker and Lewis.1 As he wrote at that time,
At no time, however, shall I argue for my position by appeal to consider-
ations involving ‘possible worlds’, because I fi nd this notion so fraught with 
epistemological and ontological diffi culties that to explicate conditional in 
terms of possible worlds must in my view, be to explain the obscure by the 
still more obscure. (Lowe 1983: 358)
Stalnaker and Lewis do employ possible worlds in their accounts of con-
ditionals, but it is possible that what makes Lowe uneasy about possible 
worlds is not that the notion of possible worlds in itself is problematic, 
but rather that in order to cope with the phenomenon of conditionals, 
Stalnaker and Lewis have resorted to some additional structures im-
posed upon possible worlds, such as “worlds closest to ours”, and “con-
stantly varying spheres of possible worlds”, etc. This partly explains 
the fact that twelve years later, in Lowe (1995), Lowe himself adopts a 
possible-world interpretation for counterfactuals as well—apparently, 
what he fi nds unacceptable are some miscellaneous notions associated 
with possible worlds, rather than possible worlds themselves.
As is remarked in Copeland (2002), in the early days of possible 
worlds, a Beckerean notion of possible worlds—or case-classes (Becker 
1952)—is a strong contender along with the familiar notion of Krip-
kean possible worlds. In this paper, I shall adopt the hierarchical pos-
sible world semantics, i.e. the so-called ‘hi-world semantics’, developed 
in Tsai (2012) and try to provide a unifi ed treatment of the logic of 
conditionals which, to a greater extent, catches the essence of everyday 
conditionals, indicative and subjunctive alike. Such semantics of con-
ditionals not only is simpler than that of Stalnaker and Lewis but also 
sticks to Lowe’s insight of using strict conditional as the backbone of 
a conditional. This in effect shows that Heylen and Horsten’s negative 
result has not been conclusive. As a matter of fact, their analysis fails 
right at the beginning when they assume that
… it would scarcely be imaginable that the correct interpretation of condi-
tionals essentially involves nested modalities. The resulting readings would 
be just too complicated for humans to use in ordinary reasoning. (Heylen 
and Horsten 2006: 540)
As we shall see soon, the hierarchical structure of a hi-world, consist-
ing of different levels of case-classes, can play an essential role in our 
understanding of modality and conditionals.
1 See, for instance, Stalnaker (1968) and Lewis (1973).
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Two simple yet insightful ideas, due to O. Becker and F. P. Ramsey 
respectively, shall be the two pillars of our unifi ed semantics for a 
language that contains conditionals. With Becker’s insight, one can, 
through recognizing worlds of different levels, avoid the paradoxes of 
material implication, and with Ramsey’s Test, we would not fall easy 
prey of the paradoxes of strict implication.
In the next section, we shall sketch the basics of Becker’s semantics 
and the hi-world semantics, regarded as an alternative to the Kripkean 
semantics, and use it as the default semantics for our subsequent inter-
pretation of modal operators. This by no means suggests that Kripke’s 
semantics is in any way inferior to the Beckerian semantics. It is just 
that the account of conditionals that we will to proposing can be more 
straightforwardly discussed in Beckerian terms.
2. Becker’s Semantics and the Hi-world Semantics
In Becker (1952), a “statistical interpretation of modal logic” was for-
mulated in terms of cases and case-classes in such a way that a non-
modal sentence P was to be evaluated against a case, while a primitive 
modal sentence (such as □P and◇P ) and an iterated modal sentence 
(such as □□P and ◇□P ) were to be evaluated against a fi rst level 
case-class2 (i.e. a set of cases) and a second level case-class (i.e. a set 
of fi rst level case-classes) respectively to yield a truth value. And the 
semantics is set up in such a way that ◇□P is true with respect to a 
set U2 of case-classes provided that among case-classes of U2, there is 
at least one case-class U1 such that P is fulfi lled in all cases contained 
in it. Higher degree situations can be worked out in the same spirit 
through induction: degree n modal sentences, i.e. iterated modal sen-
tences with n modal operators, are to be evaluated against a level n 
case-class, where a level k case-class is a set of level k-1 case-classes, 
and a level 0 case-class is simply a case. A level 0 case can be seen, if 
one prefers, as a possible world, or, more properly, a plain world. A 
possible interpretation of the set U1 is that it consists of all possible 
worlds consistent with one’s present knowledge about the actual world. 
And, contrary to what some possible-world theorists would have said, 
this interpretation suggests that counterfactual possible worlds might 
not reside in U1, but rather reside in some subsets of U2. This in effect 
introduces a stratifi cation into the realm of possibility.
A sentence of the form ‘p or q’ can be concerned with two different 
kinds of entities. It may be saying something about a plain world w, 
claiming that the world is in the state prescribed by the sentence, or 
it may be saying something about a set U of possible worlds—claiming 
that each of those possible worlds is in the state prescribed in the ear-
lier sense. So, the disjunction ‘p or q’ can be translated either into pq 
or pq, which abbreviates □(pq), and be evaluated against w and U 
2 Copeland’s translation of Fallklasse is adopted here. See Copeland (2002).
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respectively. The fact that no one would think ‘I live on Earth or I shall 
be assassinated by a Martian’ is true, while everyone would accept that 
‘I live on Earth or I live on Mars’ is true does suggest that there is some 
subtle mechanism that drives us to take the U-reading for the former 
and the w-reading for the latter. So far as the semantics of a formal 
language is concerned, however, we do not need to know exactly how 
that mechanism works—we only need to acknowledge the existence of 
these two readings and know that they can be expressed in terms of 
connectives  and  respectively.
Let us illustrate this phenomenon further with the direct argument 
discussed in Stalnaker (1975: 269).
   (P) Either the butler or the gardener did it.
 ∴(C) If the butler didn’t do it, the gardener did.
Stalnaker elaborates on his pragmatic account and claims that the ar-
gument is indeed a reasonable inference but it is invalid nonetheless, 
so the validity of the following argument
(P1) The butler did it.
∴ (C)   If the butler didn’t do it, the gardener did.
would not follow from the apparent validity of ‘P1/∴P’. But, for us, it 
is only a matter of what reading—w-reading or U-reading—a speaker 
tends to have in mind for each of the sentences involved in the argu-
ment. The following are some of the possibilities, where pq here ab-
breviates □(pq).
1. [P1–w; P–w; C–w]
 B/∴BG valid, BG /∴BG valid, and B /∴BG valid;
2. [P1–w; P–w; C–U]
 B/∴BG valid, BG /∴BG invalid, and B /∴BG invalid;
3. [P1–w; P–U; C–U]
 B/∴BG invalid, BG /∴BG valid, and B /∴BG invalid;
4. [P1–w; P–w; P–U ; C–U]
 B/∴BG valid, BG /∴BG valid, and B /∴BG invalid;
Clearly, only Case 4 captures the intuition of Stalnaker’s reader—be-
fore the notion of “reasonable inference” were made available—but it 
involves a subtle shift in the interpretation of the disjunction ‘either 
the butler or the gardener did it’ from one argument to another.
This is a promising result for Becker’s semantics, but Becker’s se-
mantics actually faces a serious challenge that partly explains its poor 
reception in the early days of possible world semantics. This is the in-
consistency in the process of evaluating sentences: sometimes you call 
for a world w, and sometimes you call for a set U of possible worlds. 
On the face of it, this separates the set of sentences into two subsets, 
w-sentences and U-sentences. But, the problem lies deeper—Becker’s 
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semantics cannot cope with sentences such as □PP, which apparently 
is neither talking merely about w nor merely about U. Fortunately, 
this problem can be solved with the introduction of hi-worlds. As the 
hi-world semantics will play an essential role in this paper, we shall 
sketch it here for easy reference and the reader is referred to Tsai 
(2012) for more details.
Let the language L of propositional modal logic be defi ned by the 
following BNF:
  := pi |  | () | () | () | () | □ | ◇
where pi is any atomic formula. A model M for L consists of a non-empty 
domain set D, together with an interpretation function I which assigns 
a subset I(pi) of D to each atomic formula pi. Intuitively, one can think 
of an element w of D as a Kripkean possible world, but to avoid confu-
sion, we shall refer to it merely as a plain-world. Now, a hi-world s is of 
the form (U0, U1, U2, …), where U0 is a plain-world w, and Ui is a level i 
world, i.e. an element of (P *)i(D), where P is the power set operator and 
P *(A)=P (A)\{}. In short, a hi-world s is an element of )()( *0 Dii P . 
A hi-world t is a sub-hi-world of s provided that i(t) i+1(s) for all i  0, 
where i is the projection into the i-th component. The interpretation 
||||M of a formula  with respect to M is given by ||||M= ii U 1 , where 
U1=I() and Ui=(P  *)i(D) for i > 1.
The hi-world semantics can then be given by
i) If  is a formula, then
 ||||M = )()( *0 Dii P \ ||||M
 ||□||M ={s )()( *0 Dii P | t ||||M for all sub-hi-worlds t of s}
 ||◇||M ={s )()( *0 Dii P | there is a sub-hi-worlds t of s such
that t ||||M }
ii) If  and  are formulas, then
 ||||M = ||||M  ||||M
 ||||M = ||||M  ||||M
 ||  ||M = ||||M
 ||  ||M = ||  ||M  ||  ||M
Interestingly, we can introduce   □() and   □(  ) 
to force the usual U-readings of disjunctions and conditionals that we 
discussed earlier.
3. Ramsey’s Test—Imposing the Antecedent
In a footnote to his paper ‘General propositions and causality’, Ramsey 
famously says the following about conditionals,
If two people are arguing ‘If p will q?’ and are both in doubt as to p, they 
are adding p hypothetically to their stock of knowledge and arguing on that 
basis about q; so that in a sense ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, q’ are contradictories.
 (Ramsey 1990: 155, footnote 1)
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This passage is usually referred to as ‘Ramsey’s Test’ in the literature. 
However, to my knowledge, Ramsey did not call it a test himself, and it 
is indeed not merely a test. It can provide us with a general truth condi-
tion for conditionals, and captures some central features of conditionals 
that have been ignored by many theorists and hence caused many un-
necessary conceptual diffi culties concerning conditionals.
In this passage, Ramsey imagines that two people are disputing 
about the truth of a conditional “If p then q” and then explains to us 
what these people actually do: they are adding p hypothetically to their 
stock of knowledge and arguing on that basis about q. In other words, 
Ramsey, in effect, outlines a truth condition for the conditional, and 
the truth condition roughly takes this form: a conditional ‘If p, q’ is true 
for S provided that S adds p hypothetically to her stock of knowledge 
and on that basis accepts q.3 Therefore, if we stick to the framework 
of a truth-conditional semantics—that the meaning of a sentence is 
exhausted by its truth condition—then Ramsey’s Test, in short RT, 
amounts to the core of a theory of conditionals.
Now, if we are indeed concerned with the truth of a conditional of 
the form ‘If p, q’, and are unsure about how the truth is to be deter-
mined—or we would not need RT in the fi rst place—then we should 
take every care to ensure that in the process of carrying out RT, no 
other conditionals are employed. For otherwise RT would become a cir-
cular process that leads us nowhere—it invites a conditional to explain 
the conditional, while the meaning of the conditional introduced re-
mains unexplained. Before spelling out what Ramsey really suggests, 
let us fi rst look at a recent debate concerning RT so as to know how 
easily RT can be misinterpreted.
In Chalmers and Hájek (2007), the authors claim that ‘Ramseyan 
and Moorean principles entail that rational subjects should accept that 
they have the epistemic powers of a god’, in short, Ramsey + Moore = 
God. Barnett (2008) on the other hand claims that Chalmers and Hájek 
have interpreted Ramsey’s Test incorrectly, and that, when suitably 
interpreted, Ramsey + Moore  God. I shall show that both accounts 
involve circular explanation of conditionals, so that their arguments in 
support of their respective results can simply be discarded.
The positions of Chalmers and Hájek (2007) and Barnett (2008) can 
be summed up as follows. According to Chalmers and Hájek, Ramsey’s 
Test amounts to the following.
(0) [C&H’s Ramsey] ‘if p then q’ is acceptable to a subject S iff, were S 
to accept p and consider q, S would accept q.
C&H’s Ramsey together with Moore’s rationality principles would yield 
that, for a rational subject,
3 Apparently, such a truth condition suggests that people could disagree upon 
the truth of a conditional. However, this is not a drawback of the account. Rather, it 
refl ects the true nature of real-life conditionals.
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 [Moore #1]  If p, then I believe p,
and
 [Moore #2]  If I believe p, then p,
are acceptable and thus we get
 Ramsey + Moore = God. — (※)
On the other hand, after introducing a notion of General Acceptabil-
ity to account for the difference between acceptance and acceptability, 
Barnett arrives at the conclusion that Ramsey’s Test should rather be 
interpreted as
(0) [Barnett’s Ramsey] ‘if p then q’ is acceptable to a subject S iff, were 
S to hypothetically accept p and, on that basis, consider q, S would, 
on that basis, accept q.
According to Barnett, with this interpretation of the Ramsey Test, 
Moore #1 and Moore #2 are no longer acceptable, and we need not be 
bothered by the absurd result (※).4
Now, the true spirit of RT is to pin down the evaluation process of 
a conditional in terms of no other conditionals, yet while (0) introduces 
‘were S to’ into its description of the process, (0) complicates the matter 
even further by coming up with the phrase ‘were S to hypothetically’. 
Note that, generally, ‘were S to’ in itself starts a counterfactual condi-
tional, which can be roughly paraphrased as ‘if S…’5 If RT is supposed 
to explain for us what ‘if … then …’ means, how can the very notion 
itself be employed to do the job? These authors have indeed gone along 
the opposite direction that Ramsey suggests us to go. They make RT 
entirely dispensable: if we can understand conditionals perfectly well, 
then what is the point of inviting RT into play in the fi rst place? The ab-
surdity of C&H program (Barnett’s is even more awkward) can be illus-
trated through the ironic equivalency of the following statements—it 
leads us to an infi nite regression without explaining what ‘if … then…’ 
actually means.
‘‘‘if p then q’ is acceptable to S1’ is acceptable to S2’ is acceptable to S3.
 ‘‘if S1 accepts p and considers q, then S1 would accept q’ is acceptable 
to S2’ is acceptable to S3. ‘if S2 accepts ‘S1 accepts p and considers q’ and considers ‘S1 accepts 
q’, then S2 would accepts ‘S1 accepts q’’ is acceptable to S3. If S3 accepts ‘S2 accepts ‘S1 accepts p and considers q’ and consid-
ers ‘S1 accepts q’’ and considers ‘S2 accepts ‘S1 accepts q’’, then S3 
would accepts ‘S2 accepts ‘S1 accepts q’’.
4 Barnett’s position is further stressed in Willer (2010: 292), where Willer tries to 
draw the reader’s attention to the fact that Ramsey “suggested that the antecedent 
is not accepted but only hypothetically added to what the agent believes to be true”.
5 Note that ‘were S to’ and ‘if S’ behave differently so far as grammar is concerned. 
But we ignore this issue.
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Alas, there is no way to get rid of the ‘if, then’. The reader, S4 say, of the 
last of these sentences still has to fi gure out whether the conditional 
‘If…then…’ is acceptable. Evidently, this is unlikely what Ramsey had 
in mind when he wrote down his famous footnote in question.
RT as a truth-condition for conditionals
One remarkable feature of RT is that Ramsey himself does not commit 
this fallacy of circularity. He uses the word ‘hypothetically’ so carefully 
that, on the one hand, one smells the fl avor of a conditional through the 
employment of the term, and on the other hand, the evaluation process 
outlined in RT remains a declarative statement of the form ‘they are … 
and …’, the grasping of which does not presuppose the grasping of ‘if … 
then ….’ Moreover, this allows us to have a truth-conditional semantics 
that can handle sentences with/without conditionals in a unifi ed way.
To decide whether someone, S say, would assert ‘if p then q’, Ramsey 
suggests that6
(R) S asserts ‘if p then q’ iff S hypothetically adds p into her stock of 
knowledge and considers q and, on that basis, asserts q.7
Note that there is nothing conditional on the right hand of ‘iff’, and 
Ramsey has succeeded in providing us with a criterion for S’s assertion 
of ‘if p then q’. The nasty problem of ‘whether if p then q?’ has now been 
turned into one concerning the mental reality of S, and the latter then 
provides us with a defi nite yes-no answer to the assertion of q given p.8 
This is the key point of Ramsey’s proposal—shifting one’s focus from 
an entailment relationship between world affairs to an entailment re-
lationship between beliefs of a person. Furthermore, we only need to 
know that there exists such a mental mechanism that would produce 
a yes-no answer to the conditional, not having to worry about what the 
detailed reasoning process of S actually is.
However, what do we mean by ‘hypothetically adding a belief p into 
one’s stock of knowledge’? Is it the same as ‘adding a belief p into one’s 
stock of knowledge’? Apparently not, because otherwise the term ‘hypo-
thetically’ would be redundant. Nevertheless, the difference is subtler 
than we expect, and it will take me some time to explain it here.
Recall that in elementary logic, to prove the argument r /p  (p  r), 
our friend S often use Conditional Proof as follows,
6 Note that on the left hand side of ‘iff’ we are using the word ‘accepts’, in contrast 
to the word ‘acceptable’ used on the left hand side of ‘iff’ in (0).
7 Some might object that in (R), I have used the term ‘iff’ which involves the 
notion of ‘if’ that I set out to explain, so I myself fall prey of the circularity problem. 
To this my reply is: i) ‘iff’ need not involve ‘if’ just as ‘=’ need not involves ‘’, ii) even 
if ‘iff’ involves ‘if’, so long as it is not used, as a meta-concept, in the defi nien—the 
Right Hand Side of ’iff’, that is—the defi nition is not guilty of circularity.
8 Some might object that asserting ‘if p then q’ and asserting q are different 
things, so (R) cannot be right. However, it will be shown later that the one that 
asserts q is not, strictly speaking, the one that asserts ‘if p then q’ in the fi rst place.
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1. r Premise
2. p Premise*
3. p  r 1, 2, Conjunction
4. p  (p  r) 2–3, Conditional Proof
Now S has a premise r in her stock of premises to begin with, which 
makes her stock of premises consisting of only one premise. Then at 
step 2, she hypothetically introduces another premise p into her stock 
of premises. A key question to ask here is ‘how many premises does S 
have now?’ If the answer is ‘one’, then S is not entitled to use the second 
premise p in step 3. If the answer is ‘two’, then it contradicts the fact 
that S has only one premise. Furthermore, S has no right to introduce 
a new premise into her stock as she wishes. What happens?
The fact is that when S gets past step 2, she is posing herself as 
some other agent Ŝ who has, in addition to all the beliefs that S has, in 
her stock of knowledge the belief p, and it is this Ŝ who does the rea-
soning at steps 2 and 3, instead of S.9 And only when we get to step 4 
does Ŝ get the sack and S goes on alone to deal with things to come. In 
sum, throughout the proof, S has only one premise (and Ŝ has two). It is 
just that at steps 2 and 3, we fi nd the recruiting of Ŝ helpful. One thing 
important to note here is that this individual Ŝ has the belief p intrin-
sically rather than hypothetically. To be more explicit, at step 2 and 3, 
there are two individuals S and Ŝ hanging around, and while the real 
S has the belief p hypothetically, the hypothetical Ŝ has p intrinsically.
Now, back to (R), with the help of this individual Ŝ, it is clear that 
the clause on the right hand side of ‘iff’ in (R) should be read as ‘Ŝ has 
p in her stock of knowledge and Ŝ considers q and Ŝ asserts q’.10 Indeed 
we have a textual support from Ramsey (1990: p155) to hypothesize 
such an individual Ŝ who has p in her stock of knowledge. The passage 
in question is this
 So that in a sense ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, −q’ are contradictories.
Recall that S is by assumption in doubt as to p, so there is no reason 
why she would fi nd p  q and p  –q contradictory—they may well be 
both false because p is a contradiction in itself. On the other hand, for 
an Ŝ who has p in her stock of knowledge, p  q and p  –q are clearly 
contradictory. So the fact that Ramsey thinks ‘If p, q’ and ‘If p, −q’ are 
contradictories suggests that he reasons as if there is such an Ŝ who 
simply has p.
9 The introduction of Ŝ turns the notion of hypothetical thinking into a concrete 
one. One can readily imagine that such Ŝ’s can be designed with the help of Artifi cial 
Intelligence.
10 The original qualifi cation ‘on that basis’ in (R) serves to remind us that the 
assertion is made by the resulting Ŝ rather than the S.
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In the end, we can spell (R) out as follows
() S asserts ‘if p then q’ iff S poses herself as an Ŝ that is like S in 
every aspect except that Ŝ has p in her stock of knowledge, and Ŝ 
considers q, and Ŝ asserts q.
On the face of it, () is easy to understand and has great explanatory 
power, but the adding of p into one’s stock of knowledge alone will inev-
itably generate some nasty problem concerning one’s personal identity. 
We will defer the treatment of this complication until Section 5.
Alternatively, we can adopt the language of hi-world semantics and 
spell (R) out more explicitly as the following truth condition:
(*) The conditional ‘if p then q’ is true for a hi-world s iff there is a 
sub-hi-world s of s such that p holds, and for any such s, q holds 
as well.
The set šp of all such sub-hi-worlds of s can be associated with the Ŝ in 
() in the following sense. Let š denote the set of all sub-hi-worlds of s, 
then šp is simply š||p||M.11 For a non-modal p, this amounts to modify-
ing the U1 of s into its intersection with the interpretation I(p), that is 
U1I(p), and obtaining a new hi-world ŝ. Thus s and ŝ correspond to S 
and Ŝ of () perfectly. This correspondence, however, may not hold for 
an antecedent p that involves modality of different levels. When p is a 
sentence that mixes modality of different levels together, for instance, 
p=(A◇B), then there may not exist an ŝ such that šp corresponds to 
the set of all sub-hi-worlds of ŝ. In such cases, ||p||M is not necessarily a 
product set, thus its intersection with the product set š, is not necessar-
ily a product set. Therefore, the Ŝ in () can only be thought of as a hy-
pothetical individual who possesses the mindset šp, which is concretely 
specifi ed as a set of hi-worlds.
As a consequence, in terms of the language of propositional mod-
al logic, Ramsey’s conditional ‘if p then q’ can be translated as ◇p 
□(pq). I shall call this the default of a conditional. The ◇p part 
plays a key role in the understanding of Ramsey’s conditional and it 
corresponds to the phrase ‘adding p hypothetically to their stock of 
knowledge’ in the Ramsey Test. In effect, ◇p forces us to consider the 
possibility of p, while the □(pq) part requires us to restrict our atten-
tion to all those worlds such that p holds, and then we set our mind on 
q to see whether for all those worlds, q holds.
Recall that the paradoxes of strict implication take the following 
form. Were ‘if p then q’ interpreted as the strict conditional □(pq), then
 S1 not ◇p /  if p then q
 S2 □q / if p then q
11 The reader is referred to Section 2 for the meaning of a sub-hi-world and the 
defi nition of ||p||M.
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are both valid argument forms, yet the following typical instances of 
them are clearly invalid,
 Ex1  /  If 1=2 then I am happy.
 Ex2  /  If I am happy then 1<2.
Now let us see how our candidate ◇p□(pq) fares on these matters. 
One interesting fact to note fi rst is that this candidate was actually by-
passed by Lowe in Lowe (1995). It can avoid the fi rst paradox of strict 
implication right away, but its alleged failure to cope with the second 
paradox of strict implication has led Lowe to turn to another candidate. 
It is not diffi cult to see that with this interpretation, S2 is indeed valid 
provided that p is possible. However, for S2 to be a non-trivial argu-
ment, the conclusion ‘if p then q’ will have to be understood differently, 
namely in a subjunctive mode, and S2 then becomes invalid. As we 
need to resort to hi-worlds to have a better grasp of the subjunctive 
mode, we will postpone the detailed treatment to the next section.
However, for the moment, we can at least observe that Ex2 is not 
an instance of S2 at all. In other words, the utterer of Ex2 may not 
reckon 1<2 as a necessary truth. So the absurdity of Ex2 may not entail 
the invalidity of S2. Hitchcock (1998) suggests that ‘p entails q’ can be 
interpreted as □(p q) (◇p ◇~q) to avoid both PSI1 and PSI2, but 
it does not work for the cases exemplifi ed by Ex 1 and Ex 2. Another 
candidate □(pq) ◇p ◇~q would render both S1 and S2 invalid as 
desired, however, the adding of ◇~q is too strong a requirement, be-
cause it would make the truism ‘if 1=1 then 1=1’ false.
In addition to the PSI, Lowe is also worried about the fact that the 
interpretation◇p□(p q) would have deemed the following state-
ment invalid, while it is surely a mathematical truism.
(#) If n were the greatest natural number, then there would be a natu-
ral number greater than n.
This, in the end, leads Lowe to propose interpreting ‘if p then q’ as 
□(p q) (◇p □q).
Indeed, (#) belongs to a category of conditionals that deserve more 
of our attention12 but Lowe’s approach solves it at the price of accepting 
the second paradox of strict implication. The introduction of the condi-
tion □q for cases where p is not possible does avoid the problem of (#), 
but it runs against the direction suggested by the second paradox of 
strict implication. On the other hand, the fact that (#) should be deemed 
valid can indeed be dealt with naturally and beautifully by the hi-world 
semantics as will be discussed in the next section. More specifi cally, 
when ~◇p is true or □q holds, we need not concede right away that ‘if 
p then q’ is true, hence Ex1 and Ex2 can be invalid while (#) is valid. 
Ramsey’s idea and Tsai’s hierarchy together allows us to deal with these 
situations in a unifi ed way which is consistent with our intuition.
12 The reader is referred to Heylen & Horsten (2005) for a revised version of it.
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4. Conditionals and hi-worlds
If ◇p □( p  q) in itself would not account for the validity of (#), how 
are we to cope with this situation?
The central idea of the hi-world semantics is that a hi-world s con-
sists of worlds Ui of different levels. Now, the Default of a conditional 
◇p□( p  q) is clearly to be evaluated against a level–1 world U1. 
However, if we have ~◇p, then no plain world w in U1 is such that p 
holds, thus seemingly an essential step in Ramsey’s Test, namely that 
of ‘adding p’, cannot be carried out. In this case, do we simply say that 
the conditional ‘if p then q’ is false? Surely not! Re-examining Ramsey’s 
Test more closely, we would fi nd that Ramsey simply assumes that 
‘adding p’ is always a possible action. In other words, if we are to be 
true to Ramsey’s spirit, then we need to be prepared to give truth val-
ues to a conditional ‘if p then q’ even for cases where p is not possible.
So, we are challenged with a Mission Impossible, are we not? Cer-
tainly not. Recall that a hi-world s can be thought of as a string of 
worlds of all levels (U0, U1, U2, …). Now, ~◇p says that there is no 
level–0 world w in the level–1 world U1 such that p holds.13 However, 
that does not mean we have no way to conceive of a plain world w in 
the entire hierarchy of s such that p holds. As a matter of fact, beside 
the most natural place to look for such worlds, namely U1, the next 
candidate that comes to our mind is certainly U2. So, when we are given 
~◇p, and prompted by Ramsey’s command to “add p to our stock of 
knowledge”, what we need to do is simply imposing ◇◇p, which claims 
that there is a level–1 world U1 in the level–2 world U2 such that there 
exists a plain world w in U1 such that p holds.14
This insight leads us to the following unifi ed account: a conditional 
‘if p then q’ in a natural language can be translated into one of the fol-
lowing sentences in the language of propositional modal logic,
 Unifi ed (p  q) or [◇p □( p  q)] or {~◇p  [◇2p □2( p  q)]}
where ◇2 and □2 are the shorthand for ◇◇ and □□ respectively. 
Note that, as we have seen in Section 2, the w-reading p  q is seldom 
what we have in mind when we utter a conditional. Furthermore, recall 
that, in Tsai (2012), under the mild assumption that UiUi+1, for i  0, 
we have that □ entails , for any , and for most people this is a quite 
natural assumption—if something happens in all possible worlds then 
it certainly would happen in this world as well. It is not diffi cult to see 
that if we adopt this assumption and disregard the primitive w-reading 
p  q, then Unifi ed simply reduces to
13 Recall that U1 is determined by one’s stock of knowledge in such a way that if 
you know that , then your U1 can only consist of plain worlds such that .
14 Gauker (2005) has introduced similar concepts, such as plain contexts and 
multi-contexts, into his account of conditionals. But unlike Gauker’s account, our 
account here is more robust, not assuming any notion similar to Lewis’ sequence of 
centered spheres.
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 Core {◇p □( p  q)} or {◇2p □2( p  q)}
One might wonder what happens to the truth of a conditional ‘if p then 
q’ if its antecedent p is not only such that ~◇p holds but also ~◇2p 
holds. Should Core render the conditional false then? As a matter of 
fact this is not an option at all, because, as suggested by Ramsey, when 
we employ conditionals to convey our thoughts, the state of affair de-
scribed by the antecedent has to be conceivable for us. If an antecedent 
is not only impossible but also necessarily impossible,15 then in prac-
tice it amounts to inconceivability for any utterer of the conditional, 
and we should regard it as meaningless—the predicate ‘true’ is simply 
inapplicable to such a conditional—rather than regard it as false. For 
instance, if you can conceive of the existence of a round square in your 
U2 then the conditional ‘if there is a round square then geometry has 
to be rewritten’ is meaningful and can be either true or false; but if 
you cannot, then the conditional is simply meaningless for you. This 
issue can be further illustrated by how we answer a query raised by 
an anonymous reviewer for an earlier version of this paper. According 
to the reviewer, while ‘if □A~A then A~A’ is seemingly true, the 
present account rules it as false because we have ~◇◇(□A~A). The 
point that I would stress here is that, given the mild assumption that 
UiUi+1, for i0, we indeed have ~◇(□A~A). But, to make sense of 
the conditional in question, we have to impose ◇◇(□A~A) anyway. 
And while it seems, at least for the reviewer, that ~◇◇(□A~A) holds 
naturally, it is not necessarily the case. While ◇p concerns possibility, 
◇◇p concerns the possibility of possibility, and to impose ◇◇p we 
would naturally drop, if necessary, the possibility scheme at the lower, 
that is ◇p, level, and this is how the present scheme works.16
Now, Core offers two possible reading for a conditional. In a real 
life discourse, a glimpse at a conditional ‘if p then q’ usually suffi ces to 
make us opt for one of them,
 Default ◇p □( p  q) when p is deemed possible,
 Subjunctive ◇2p □2( p  q) with p is deemed impossible.
Interested readers can check for themselves that the famous pair of 
Oswald-Kennedy conditionals can be explained in terms of these two 
readings. In the indicative mood, due to the known fact that the assas-
sination has indeed happened, our U1 does not contain any plain world 
in which Kennedy has not been assassinated; while in the subjunctive 
mood, our U1 consists only of plain worlds in which Kennedy was assas-
sinated by Oswald, so in order to impose the antecedent we are forced 
to resort to some plain worlds in some U1 of U2 in which Oswald did 
15 Theoretically one might consider pushing the possibility to still higher levels, 
for instance, taking into account ◇3p. But in practice, reaching ◇2p suffi ces for our 
everyday purposes.
16 In this example, drop the condition that all sub-hi-worlds should satisfy the 
condition UiUi+1, for i  0 as well.
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not assassinate Kennedy and to see whether in those plain worlds Ken-
nedy would still be assassinated at all—by others, of course.
We have seen previously that the Default reading renders (#) false 
while our intuition deems it true. With the Subjunctive reading at 
hand, however, we can easily see that (#) can now be true if we could 
imagine the existence of a pseudo-mathematical system in which there 
is a greatest natural number n, and for such pseudo-mathematical sys-
tems we can always fi nd a natural number greater than n.17
With this, the truth of the following two conditionals would agree 
with a layman’s intuition that (a) is false while (b) is true
(a) If 38=2187 then 38=21873.
(b) If 38=2187 then 39=21873.
According to proponents of strict implication, the mathematical truth 
that 38=21873=6561 makes the antecedent 38=2187 necessarily false, 
so both (a) and (b) are true. But an evaluator of these conditionals may 
not be aware of 38=6561, so her U1 may indeed contain worlds in which 
38=2187 holds, so that the conditionals are not deemed true automati-
cally. Even if the evaluator happens to be an expert in numbers who 
knows that 38=2187 is necessarily false, according to Ramsey’s require-
ment of forcing the antecedent, he still has to force himself to accept 
◇2p, and the truth values of (a) and (b) are still to be decided pending 




□( p  q)
Lowe
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Default
□( p  q)
◇p
Core Intuition
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Note that Core differs from the other candidates in that it allows us 
to resort to second order modalities. To further appreciate the power of 
Core, let us consider the following example of iterated strengthening 
of the antecedent
 1) If John wins the race then Jane will be happy.
 2) If John wins the race and dies of a heart attack  
 immediately afterward, then Jane will be happy.
17 It may contain results that are inconsistent with present day mathematics. 
The lesson one learns from (#) may be this: given that such pseudo mathematical 
systems are all inconsistent—the antecedent is inconsistent with present day 
mathematic—we conclude that it is impossible for the antecedent of (#) to be true, 
hence the Subjunctive reading is justifi ed.
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It takes the following form
 1) If A then D,
 2) If A and B then D.
According to the MI and SI accounts of conditionals, they should be 
translated as AD, (AB) D, and □(AD), □((AB) D), respectively. 
And for both accounts, the truth of 1) guarantees that of 2). But in 
practice, it is very likely that one would assert 1) and deny 2). So we 
need new interpretations of 1) and 2). According to the account out-
lined earlier, they can be translated as
 1) ◇A □( A  D) w.r.t. s=(U0, U1, U2, …)
 2) ◇2(AB) □2((AB)  D) w.r.t. s=(U0, U1, U2, …)
The fact that 2) is thought to be false comes in two steps. First, the 
Default reading of 2), namely ◇(AB) □((AB)  D), is inapplicable 
because in one’s mind, no world in U1 is such that AB—otherwise he 
or she would not assert 1) in the fi rst place—so the fi rst conjunct is 
false right away. Second, the Subjunctive reading ◇2(AB) □2((AB) 
 D) of 2) asks us to search in U2 for some U1 such that it contains a 
plain worlds w for which AB holds, and then see whether all such 
worlds w’s in all such U1’s are such that D. As it is usually not the case 
that Jane would be happy in those circumstances, we would regard the 
Subjunctive reading as false.
The merit of this account is that its prediction for the reverse Sobel 
sequence automatically conforms to our intuition. Evidently, when ‘if 
A and B then D’ and ‘if A then D’ is uttered in this order, no indicative-
subjunctive shift will be triggered: ◇(AB) itself entails ◇A, and if 
□((AB) D) is false then so is □(A D).
An interesting pragmatic feature to note here is that the hi-world 
associated with a speaker can actually be a dynamic entity, in the sense 
that it can evolve with discourse. For example, a new U1 may evolve from 
a previous U2 after a discourse involving the strengthening of the ante-
cedent. I believe that this can serve as the ground for a general account 
of Belief Revision. However, it will have to be dealt with elsewhere.
The other two invalid argument forms that are discussed in Lewis’ 
account of counterfactual, namely Contraposition and Transitivity, can 
be similarly analyzed.
The Lewis-style example of “Contraposition”
  If Peter drinks, he won’t get drunk.
  Had Peter gotten drunk, he didn’t drink.
can be translated into the following argument and it is invalid.
  ◇A □( A ~(AD))
 ◇2 (AD) □2((AD) ~A)
And the Lewisian example of “Transitivity”
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If J. Edgar Hoover had been a communist, he would have been a traitor,
If he had been born a Russian, then he would have been a communist,
 If he had been born a Russian, he would have been a traitor.
can be translated into the following argument18 and it is invalid.
   ◇C □( C  T)
    ◇2R □2( R  C)
◇2R □2( R  T)
Finally, the belated resolution of the second paradox of strict implica-
tion is achieved by spelling S2 out as
S2 □q / ◇2p □2( p  q),
which is invalid again as expected.
5. A Further Complication 
Concerning the Thomason conditionals
Let us now come back to the charge of Chalmers & Hájek (2007) that 
Ramsey + Moore = God. For brevity and relevancy to the present paper, 
I shall consider issues associated with Moore #1 only, and leave Moore 
#2 untouched here—interested readers can work out the latter without 
much diffi culty. In other words, I shall only be concerned with whether 
Ramsey + Moore = Omniscience. According to (R), for S to accept ‘if p 
then I believe p’ is for S to hypothetically add p into her stock of knowl-
edge and considers ‘I believe p’ and accepts ‘I believe p’. In terms of (), 
Moore #1 should be stated as
[Moore #1 ()] For every rational being S who considers ‘if p then I believe 
p’, S poses herself as an Ŝ that is like S in every aspect except that Ŝ has 
p in her stock of knowledge, and Ŝ considers ‘I believe p’, and Ŝ accepts ‘I 
believe p’.19
On the face of it, this seems obviously true, but in that case, aren’t we 
on our way to the claim that Ramsey + Moore = Omniscience? I now 
draw the reader’s attention to a subtle point that distinguishes two 
readings of [Moore #1 ()]. As I have pointed out earlier in Section 3, it 
18 Despite that the fi rst premise takes the form of a subjunctive conditional, 
it reckons the possibility that future evidences reveal that Hoover was indeed a 
communist, so should be translated according to the Default interpretation.
19 Alternatively, in terms of (*), we can think of S as a hi-world s and Ŝ as 
capable of leading us to a set šp of hi-worlds such that for any s in šp, p holds. And our 
job is to decide whether ‘I believe p’ holds for sas well. Recall that for a non-modal 
p, my notion of S and Ŝ actually correspond to hi-worlds s and ŝ respectively. But, 
as the reader may not be familiar with the abstract notion of hi-world semantics, 
in the main text, I will continue using the metaphorical S and Ŝ to explain what is 
going on.
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is important to note that in the consideration of q—i.e. ‘I believe p’—it 
is Ŝ who does the reasoning, while Ŝ is a hypothetical individual who 
plays only a temporary role for the duration of the evaluation of the 
conditional. In that case, what is the referent of the ‘I’ that appears in 
q? There are two possibilities
 i) (Autistic-Ŝ reading) The ‘I’ denotes Ŝ. In this case, Moore #1 is 
 true. The term ‘autistic’ is adopted here because, during the rea-
 soning process, Ŝ thinks of the referent ‘I’ as sharing her mental 
 state concerning the belief p.20
 ii) (Realistic-Ŝ reading) The ‘I’ denotes S. In this case, Moore #1 is 
 false. Here Ŝ thinks of the referent ‘I’ as S, i.e. the person she 
 really was.
In sum, according to the autistic reading, when considering ‘if p then 
q’, the subject in q shares the knowledge state of the hypothetical indi-
vidual Ŝ, while in the realistic reading, the subject in q is unaffected by 
the knowledge state of Ŝ. And so long as we bear in mind the distinction 
between these two readings, we can easily see that while Moore #1 may 
hold for the autistic Ramsey, it does not hold for the realistic Ramsey. 
Given the absurdity of ‘Ramsey + Moore = Omniscience’, we conclude 
that when taken as a statement of rationality, ‘if p then I believe p’ 
suggests an autistic reading (which is obviously true); yet when taken 
as a statement of omniscience, ‘if p then I believe p’ suggests a realistic 
reading (which is unlikely to be true). And () itself does not tell us how 
Ŝ is to conceive of the “I”.
To illustrate this point further, consider the following pair of sen-
tences.
 A1 If there is a bomb in this room, I will leave the room in no time.
 R1 If there is a bomb in this room, I will be blown into pieces.
Both sentences sound acceptable. However, if Ramsey’s remark that ‘if 
p, q’ and ‘if p, –q’ are contradictories is correct, then A1 and R1 cannot 
be both true. But, how come we feel that both of them are true? It is 
because that in A1, Ŝ reads the ‘I’ as Ŝ, while in R1, Ŝ reads the ‘I’ as 
S. And while Ŝ knows that there is a bomb in this room, S does not. It 
is important to note that in considering a conditional, S seems to gain 
an additional pair of eyes, namely that of the hypothetical Ŝ, yet it is 
Ŝ who does the reasoning and Ŝ can decide whether she would like the 
self-refl exive ‘I’ to refer to Ŝ or S. Similar examples abound.
20 It is helpful to recall a famous setting concerning autism. Suppose an individual 
Ŝ was watching, through a semi-transparent glass window, what another individual 
S was doing in his room. Now, before S went out of the room to fetch some water, 
he put his fountain pen into #1 drawer of the desk and closed the drawer. While S 
was absent, someone sneaked into the room and took out the pen, put it into the #2 
drawer, closed the drawer and then left. Now, when we ask Ŝ ‘Which drawer would 
S open in order to retrieve his fountain pen after he comes back?’ an autistic Ŝ would 
allegedly say #2, while an Ŝ with second person perspective would have said #1.
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 A2 If there is a ton of gold buried under my house, I would 
  dig it up and become a rich man.
 R2 If there is a ton of gold buried under my house, I wouldn’t have 
  known it and would thus remain poor.
 A3 If tonight’s lottery winning numbers are 1~6, I will pick these 
  numbers on my ticket and win the lottery.
 R3 If tonight’s lottery winning numbers are 1~6, I will have no 
  chance of winning it.
Here, in the autistic A2 and A3, the ‘I’ refers to Ŝ, who has the anteced-
ent in her stock of knowledge, while in the realistic R2 and R3, the ‘I’ 
refers to S, who, under realistic conditions, does not have the anteced-
ent in her stock of knowledge.
Note that the Thomason Conditional as discussed in van Fraassen 
(1980) can be similarly analyzed.
 (3) If my business partner is cheating on me, I will never know it.
Apparently, the autistic reading of the ‘I’ as Ŝ in (3) renders it obviously 
false, and the realistic reading of the ‘I’ as S in (3) renders it likely true. 
However, the fact that the knowledge state of ‘I’ is the sole concern of 
the consequent suggests that the ‘I’ should be understood as S rather 
than Ŝ—given that the antecedent is by default in the stock of knowl-
edge of Ŝ, pragmatics would deem it inappropriate for someone to deny 
this very fact in the consequent—thus (3) is likely to be true even in 
the realm of RT.
Now consider two analogous examples from Lewis (1986) and Jack-
son (1987) respectively:21
 (4) If Reagan works for the KGB, I’ll never believe it.
 (5) If Reagan is bald, no one outside his immediate family knows it.
Note that Ramsey’s Test itself does not, as many might have supposed, 
render (4) false directly, because, once again, we have two possible 
readings of the ‘I’ in (4). For (4) to be informative, the truth of the conse-
quent should not be too obvious. Yet the autistic reading of (4), namely 
seeing the ‘I’ as Ŝ, will, together with the assumption that Ŝ is ratio-
nal, render the consequent evidently false. Therefore, the only possible 
reading left is the realistic one. Similarly, for (5) to be possibly true 
rather than trivially false, Ŝ can only adopt the realistic reading, not 
counting Ŝ as someone outside Reagan’s immediate family who knows 
of Reagan’s baldness.
In sum, in (3) ~ (5), the realistic reading renders them possibly true, 
while the autistic reading renders them false, and the Non-Triviality 
criterion of the consequent suggests that the realistic reading is pre-
ferred. Our analysis can be generalized even further to cases where 
21 According to Willer (2010), footnote 2, what is characteristic of such 
conditionals, is that “the consequent asserts the agent’s ignorance or disbelief of the 
fact described in the antecedent”.
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the consequent does not involve the fi rst person. Consider the following 
conditional,
 (6) If Reagan works for the KGB, Ramsey will know it.
When S is trying to determine the truth of (6), she would fi rst turn 
herself into an Ŝ, and then decide whether Ŝ’s Ramsey shares with Ŝ 
the knowledge of the antecedent of (6). If the answer is ‘yes’, then she is 
having the autistic reading of Ramsey, i.e. forcing her Ramsey to know 
out of the blue the thing she herself knows. The use of the term ‘autis-
tic’ is justifi ed by the fact that Ŝ imposes the knowledge of Reagan’s be-
ing a double agent—part of Ŝ’s mental state—onto Ramsey. If the an-
swer is ‘no’, then the ‘Ramsey’ is read realistically. And I believe most 
people would, taking into consideration the Non-Triviality criterion I 
mentioned earlier, read (6) the realistic way and render it likely false.
Variants of (6) can admit an autistic reading as well. Consider, for 
instance, the following conditional,
 (7) If Reagan works for the KGB, Ramsey will report it.
If the ‘Ramsey’ in (7) is read realistically, then there is no guarantee 
that he knows that Reagan works for the KGB, and then how on the 
earth can we expect him to report it? Nonetheless, many people would 
be happy to accept (7), taking into account the fearless character of 
Ramsey. That is to say, they tend to read the Ramsey in (7) as already 
possessing, as Ŝ does, the knowledge of Reagan’s being a double agent. 
I believe such an autistic reading is the default reading when one faces 
(7). In contrast to the Non-Triviality criterion that I have employed in 
the reading of (6) so as to make sure that (6) is informative rather than 
being a truism, here a Relevancy criterion ensures that the ‘Ramsey’ 
in (7) has the relevant background information for him to decide upon 
whether to report it or not.22
As is evident from the analysis of this Section, our account set up in 
the previous sections alone cannot successfully resolve Chalmers and 
Hájek’s challenge. However, with the discovery of this additional sub-
tle distinction between autistic and realistic readings, such problems 
are solved in the end.
22 Finally, it is interesting to observe that (7) can admit a realistic reading still, 
and it can be easily illustrated by the following dialogue.
Q: If Reagan works for the KGB, will Ramsey report it?
A: No way!
Q: How come?
A: Ramsey died before Reagan turned nineteen!
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6. Conclusion
Becker prompts us to distinguish between talks about cases and talks 
about case-classes, and Ramsey reminds us how conditionals are used 
in daily language, in particular, he stresses the key step of imposing 
the antecedent in the process of evaluating a conditional. Hi-world se-
mantics incorporates Becker’s insight into a single framework so that 
all sentences are evaluated against a hi-world s, which consists in a 
string of worlds of all levels (U0, U1, U2, …). Indicative conditional ‘if 
p, q’ and subjunctive conditional ‘were p, q’ can then, usually, be ex-
pressed as ◇p □( p  q) and ◇2p □2( p  q) respectively.
One further complication concerning conditionals was illustrated by 
a recent debate about whether Ramsey + Moore = God. Our account 
sheds light on this matter by revealing that an autistic reading and a 
realistic reading of the indexical ‘I’ in ‘If p then I believe p’ have been 
employed by Chalmers and others to affi rm the thesis of rationality 
and to assert the omniscience thesis at the same time. While rational-
ity thesis generally concerns about the reaction of an individual S after 
she is aware of the affair p, i.e. it concerns Ŝ rather than S, for S to 
be omniscient and know things in the future, she is expected to know 
them beforehand, and this amounts to reading the ‘I’ in ‘If p then I 
believe p’ as S rather than Ŝ. This subtle shift from reading ‘I’ as Ŝ to 
reading it as S, subsequently turning an acceptable rationality state-
ment to an unacceptable omniscience statement, then accounts for the 
confusion involved in Chalmers and Hájek (2007) and Barnett (2008).
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